Variable EventSequenceQuantificationExampleConst

Type declaration

• ReadonlybarrierTreatment: {
      barrierCapacityBasis: "Design specifications with uncertainty factors";
      barrierChallengesTreatment: "Phenomenological analysis using validated codes";
      barrierFailureModes: {
          Containment: readonly [
              "Overpressure",
              "Isolation Failure",
              "Basemat Melt-through",
          ];
          "Fuel Cladding": readonly ["Overtemperature", "Mechanical Damage"];
          "RCS Boundary": readonly ["LOCA", "PORV Failure", "SG Tube Rupture"];
      };
      barrierIntegrationMethod: {
          Containment: "Linked to release category binning";
          "Fuel Cladding": "Core damage timing from MAAP analyses";
          "RCS Boundary": "Explicit modeling in event trees";
      };
      barrierPhenomena: {
          Containment: readonly [
              "Hydrogen combustion",
              "Steam explosion",
              "Corium-concrete interaction",
          ];
          "Fuel Cladding": readonly ["Oxidation", "Melting", "Relocation"];
          "RCS Boundary": readonly [
              "Thermal creep",
              "Pressurization",
              "Thermal shock",
          ];
      };
      barriersConsidered: readonly [
          "Fuel Cladding",
          "RCS Boundary",
          "Containment",
      ];
  }

• ReadonlydependencyTreatment: {
      commonCauseFailures: {
          ccfGroupsModeled: readonly [
              "Diesel Generators",
              "Motor Operated Valves",
              "Pumps",
          ];
          modelingApproach: "Alpha Factor Model";
          parameterBasis: "Industry data with Bayesian update using plant-specific experience";
      };
      dependenciesByType: {
          COMMON_CAUSE: {
              examples: readonly ["CCF of redundant pumps"];
              modelingMethod: "CCF groups with alpha factors";
              treatmentDescription: "Common cause failures modeled with alpha factor method";
          };
          FUNCTIONAL: {
              examples: readonly [
                  "Support system X failure impacts frontline systems Y and Z",
              ];
              modelingMethod: "Shared basic events and logical connections";
              treatmentDescription: "Modeled through explicit system fault tree linking";
          };
          HUMAN: {
              examples: readonly [
                  "Dependency between diagnosis actions in procedure X",
              ];
              modelingMethod: "THERP methodology with dependency adjustment";
              treatmentDescription: "Dependencies between actions modeled using HRA dependency factors";
          };
          OPERATIONAL: {
              examples: readonly ["Operator actions based on plant state"];
              modelingMethod: "Procedural dependencies in event trees";
              treatmentDescription: "Operational dependencies modeled explicitly";
          };
          PHENOMENOLOGICAL: {
              examples: readonly ["Containment pressure affecting ECCS performance"];
              modelingMethod: "Thermal-hydraulic analysis results incorporated";
              treatmentDescription: "Phenomenological dependencies modeled with physics-based models";
          };
          PHYSICAL: {
              examples: readonly ["Fire in room A affects multiple components"];
              modelingMethod: "CCF parameters based on spatial analysis";
              treatmentDescription: "Spatial dependencies addressed through common cause failure groups";
          };
      };
      phenomenologicalDependencies: {
          basisForApproach: "Thermal-hydraulic analyses validated against experiments";
          modelingApproach: "Explicit modeling with MAAP code results";
          phenomenaConsidered: readonly [
              "Room heatup",
              "Containment pressure effects",
              "Hydrogen generation",
          ];
      };
      postInitiatorHFEDependencies: {
          dependencyMethod: "THERP dependency model with time and resource factors";
          dependentHFEExamples: readonly [
              "HFE-001 and HFE-002 have high dependency due to same crew and short time window",
          ];
          methodBasis: "NUREG/CR-1278 with plant-specific adaptations";
      };
      recoveryActionDependencies: {
          dependenciesConsidered: readonly [
              "Time available",
              "Staffing",
              "Environmental conditions",
          ];
          modelingApproach: "Time-based non-recovery probability curves with dependency factors";
          recoveryActionsModeled: readonly [
              "Offsite power recovery",
              "Local manual valve operation",
          ];
      };
  }

• Readonlydocumentation: {
      appliedMethods: readonly [
          "Fault Tree Linking",
          "Monte Carlo Uncertainty Propagation",
      ];
      asymmetriesInModeling: "Train-specific modeling for key systems to capture asymmetric dependencies";
      comparisonToSimilarPlants: "Results are consistent with similar plants within expected variation";
      computerCodeUsed: "RISKMAN 3.2 with CAFTA 6.0 integration";
      cutsetReviewProcess: "Top 100 cutsets were reviewed by a multi-disciplinary team";
      dependenciesTreatment: "Functional, physical, and human dependencies were modeled explicitly";
      eventSequencesAndBinning: "Sequences were binned based on initiating event, system response, and end state";
      familyFrequencies: {
          "ESF-LOCA-SMALL": "2.3E-6 per year";
          "ESF-LOOP": "8.5E-6 per year";
      };
      inputs: readonly [
          "Event trees from Event Sequence Analysis",
          "Fault trees from Systems Analysis",
          "HEPs from Human Reliability Analysis",
          "Parameter distributions from Data Analysis",
      ];
      intermediateStatesApproach: "Plant damage states used as intermediate end states for Level 2 analysis";
      mutuallyExclusiveEventsTreatment: "Boolean reduction with explicit removal of impossible combinations";
      name: "Event Sequence Quantification Documentation";
      nonRecoveryTermsProcess: "Recovery actions were modeled using time-based non-recovery curves";
      processDescription: "Event sequences were quantified using fault tree linking with RISKMAN software";
      quantificationProcess: "Full event tree/fault tree linking with circular logic resolution";
      radionuclideBarrierTreatment: "Barrier failures were integrated into the event sequence model";
      resultsSummary: "Total frequency of all sequences is 2.3E-5 per year with Small LOCA and LOOP sequences dominating";
      riskInsights: readonly [
          "Diesel generator reliability is a key factor in risk",
          "Human actions during small LOCA sequences are significant contributors",
      ];
      riskSignificanceDrivers: "Sequences involving loss of all AC power and small LOCAs with injection failure";
      truncationProcess: "Progressive truncation from 1E-8 to 1E-12 to demonstrate convergence";
      uuid: "doc-001";
  }

• ReadonlyeventSequenceFamilies: {
      "ESF-LOCA-SMALL": {
          dependenciesConsideredInGrouping: true;
          description: "Event sequences initiated by small loss of coolant accidents";
          familyId: "ESF-LOCA-SMALL";
          groupingCriteria: "Similar initiating event and mitigating system requirements";
          memberSequenceIds: readonly [
              "ES-SLOCA-001",
              "ES-SLOCA-002",
              "ES-SLOCA-003",
          ];
          name: "Small LOCA Event Sequence Family";
          representativeInitiatingEventId: "IE-SLOCA";
          representativeSequenceId: "ES-SLOCA-001";
          uuid: "f8c7e536-9c2a-4d8b-b5d3-8a45fb4763e1";
      };
      "ESF-LOOP": {
          description: "Event sequences initiated by loss of offsite power";
          familyId: "ESF-LOOP";
          groupingCriteria: "Similar plant response and power recovery options";
          memberSequenceIds: readonly ["ES-LOOP-001", "ES-LOOP-002"];
          name: "Loss of Offsite Power Event Sequence Family";
          representativeInitiatingEventId: "IE-LOOP";
          representativeSequenceId: "ES-LOOP-001";
          uuid: "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-a1b2-c3d4e5f67890";
      };
  }

• ReadonlyimportanceAnalysis: {
      FUSSELL_VESELY: {
          analysisType: "FUSSELL_VESELY";
          basicEventImportance: {
              "BE-DG-A-FAIL-START": 0.23;
              "BE-PUMP-B-FAIL-RUN": 0.18;
          };
          scope: "OVERALL";
          significanceCutoff: 0.05;
          significantBasicEvents: readonly [
              "BE-DG-A-FAIL-START",
              "BE-PUMP-B-FAIL-RUN",
          ];
      };
      RISK_ACHIEVEMENT_WORTH: {
          analysisType: "RISK_ACHIEVEMENT_WORTH";
          basicEventImportance: {
              "BE-DG-A-FAIL-START": 8.5;
              "BE-PUMP-B-FAIL-RUN": 3.2;
          };
          scope: "OVERALL";
          significanceCutoff: 2;
          significantBasicEvents: readonly [
              "BE-DG-A-FAIL-START",
              "BE-PUMP-B-FAIL-RUN",
          ];
      };
  }

• ReadonlylimitationsDocumentation: {
      dataLimitations: readonly [
          "Limited plant-specific data for some components",
      ];
      modelIntegrationLimitations: readonly [
          "Simplifications in dependency modeling between technical elements",
      ];
      quantificationLimitations: readonly [
          {
              applicationImpact: "May affect uncertainty in specific sequences";
              description: "Limited plant-specific data for certain components";
              limitationId: "LIM-001";
              potentialWorkarounds: "Use of sensitivity studies to bound impact";
          },
          {
              applicationImpact: "May affect success criteria for boundary cases";
              description: "Simplifications in thermal-hydraulic modeling";
              limitationId: "LIM-002";
              potentialWorkarounds: "Conservative success criteria used";
          },
      ];
      validationLimitations: readonly [
          "Limited validation against operational experience",
      ];
  }

• ReadonlylogicalChallenges: {
      circularLogic: {
          "CIRC-001": {
              description: "Circular dependency between electrical power system and service water system";
              detectionMethod: "Automated detection using fault tree analyzer";
              id: "CIRC-001";
              involvedElementIds: readonly ["SYS-EPS", "SYS-SWS"];
              resolutionDescription: "Used conditional split fractions to break the loop";
              resolutionImpact: "Less than 5% impact on overall results";
              resolutionMethod: CONDITIONAL_SPLIT_FRACTIONS;
          };
      };
      mutuallyExclusiveEvents: {
          "MEX-001": {
              basis: "Different design and location";
              description: "Pump A and Pump B cannot both fail due to same cause";
              eventIds: readonly ["BE-PUMP-A-CCF", "BE-PUMP-B-CCF"];
              id: "MEX-001";
              treatmentMethod: "Explicit logic in fault trees";
          };
      };
      systemSuccessTreatment: {
          impactOnResults: "10-15% reduction in certain sequence frequencies";
          modelingExamples: readonly [
              "Success of system X credited in sequence Y with appropriate dependencies",
          ];
          systemsWithSuccessModeled: readonly [
              "High Pressure Injection",
              "Auxiliary Feedwater",
          ];
          treatmentMethod: "Explicit modeling in event trees and fault trees";
      };
  }

• ReadonlymechanisticSourceTermAnalysisReferences: readonly ["MST-REP-001", "MST-CALC-002"]

• Readonlymetadata: {
      analysisDate: "2024-07-26";
      analyst: "Jane Doe";
      approvalStatus: "Approved";
      assumptions: readonly [
          {
              description: "No external events considered in this quantification.";
          },
      ];
      limitations: readonly ["Conservative assumptions used for some parameters"];
      reviewer: "John Smith";
      scope: readonly ["Internal Events"];
      version: "1.0";
  }

• ReadonlymodelIntegration: {
      integrationIssues: readonly [
          {
              description: "Interface issue between event tree and fault tree software";
              resolution: "Custom interface script developed and validated";
          },
      ];
      integrationMethod: "Linked Event Trees with Fault Trees";
      integrationSteps: readonly [
          "Link initiating events to event trees",
          "Map system failures to fault trees",
          "Integrate human failure events with dependency factors",
          "Incorporate recovery actions",
          "Resolve circular logic",
      ];
      integrationVerification: "Verified through manual checks of selected sequences and automated software verification";
      softwareTools: readonly ["RISKMAN", "CAFTA", "HRA Calculator"];
  }

• ReadonlyquantificationMethods: {
      approach: FAULT_TREE_LINKING;
      computerCodes: readonly [
          {
              name: "RISKMAN";
              validationReference: "VALID-RISKMAN-3.2-001";
              version: "3.2";
          },
          {
              name: "CAFTA";
              validationReference: "VALID-CAFTA-6.0-001";
              version: "6.0";
          },
      ];
      postInitiatorHFEHandling: "Modeled using HRA calculator with dependency factors";
      recoveryActionHandling: "Explicit modeling in event trees with dependencies";
      truncation: {
          basisForSelection: "Less than 1% change in total frequency";
          convergenceDemonstration: "Frequency stabilized with less than 0.5% change for the final two truncation values";
          finalTruncationValue: 1e-12;
          frequencyAtTruncation: {
              "1e-10": 0.00000228;
              "1e-11": 0.00000229;
              "1e-12": 0.0000023;
              "1e-8": 0.0000021;
              "1e-9": 0.00000225;
          };
          percentageChangeAtTruncation: {
              "1e-10": 1.3;
              "1e-11": 0.4;
              "1e-12": 0.1;
              "1e-9": 7.1;
          };
          truncationMethod: ABSOLUTE_FREQUENCY;
          truncationProgression: readonly [1e-8, 1e-9, 1e-10, 1e-11, 1e-12];
      };
  }

• ReadonlyquantificationResults: {
      "ES-SLOCA-001": {
          meanFrequency: { unit: "per-year"; value: 0.0000015 };
          sequenceId: "ES-SLOCA-001";
          sequenceType: "INDIVIDUAL";
          uncertaintyDistribution: {
              parameters: { errorFactor: 2.8; median: 0.0000012 };
              type: LOGNORMAL;
          };
      };
      "ESF-LOCA-SMALL": {
          confidenceIntervals: {
              percentile05: 4e-7;
              percentile50: 0.0000018;
              percentile95: 0.0000072;
          };
          meanFrequency: { unit: "per-year"; value: 0.0000023 };
          sensitivityResults: readonly [
              {
                  frequencyEffect: readonly [0.0000035, 0.0000012];
                  parameter: "Operator Recovery Action Time";
                  range: readonly [15, 45];
              },
          ];
          sequenceId: "ESF-LOCA-SMALL";
          sequenceType: "FAMILY";
          significantUncertaintySources: readonly [
              "Human Error Probabilities",
              "Component Failure Rates",
          ];
          uncertaintyDistribution: {
              parameters: { errorFactor: 3; median: 0.0000018 };
              type: LOGNORMAL;
          };
      };
  }

• Readonlytechnical-element-code: "ESQ"

• Readonlytechnical-element-type: EVENT_SEQUENCE_QUANTIFICATION

• ReadonlyuncertaintyAnalysis: {
      modelUncertainties: readonly [
          {
              description: "Success criteria for high pressure injection";
              impact: "Moderate impact on SLOCA sequences";
              isQuantified: false;
              treatmentApproach: "Sensitivity analysis";
              uncertaintyId: "MU-001";
          },
      ];
      numberOfSamples: 10000;
      parameterUncertainties: readonly [
          {
              basis: "Industry data with Bayesian update";
              distributionParameters: { errorFactor: 3; mean: 0.001 };
              distributionType: LOGNORMAL;
              parameterId: "PARAM-001";
          },
      ];
      propagationMethod: "MONTE_CARLO";
      randomSeed: 12345;
      sensitivityStudies: readonly [
          {
              conclusion: "Further thermal-hydraulic analysis needed";
              parameter: "Success Criteria for HPI";
              parameterRanges: { "HPI Success Criteria": readonly [1, 2] };
              result: "Factor of 2 change in SLOCA sequence frequency";
              uuid: "sens-001";
              variationRange: readonly ["1/3 pumps", "2/3 pumps"];
              variedParameters: readonly ["HPI Success Criteria"];
          },
      ];
  }

• ReadonlyuncertaintyDocumentation: {
      keyAssumptions: readonly [
          {
              description: "No external events considered in this quantification";
              impact: "Results only applicable to internal events risk";
          },
          {
              description: "Mission time of 24 hours for all systems";
              impact: "May underestimate long-term scenarios";
          },
      ];
      modelUncertaintySources: readonly [
          {
              alternativeApproaches: readonly ["More conservative success criteria"];
              description: "Uncertainty in success criteria for high pressure injection";
              impact: "Moderate impact on SLOCA sequence frequencies";
              relatedAssumptions: readonly [
                  "Success assumed based on design calculations",
              ];
              sourceId: "MU-001";
              treatmentApproach: "Sensitivity analysis performed";
          },
      ];
      reasonableAlternatives: readonly [
          {
              alternative: "Alternative success criteria for high pressure injection";
              applicableElements: readonly ["High Pressure Injection System"];
              reasonNotSelected: "Thermal-hydraulic analysis supports current criteria";
          },
      ];
  }